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Private Pressure for Social Change in South Africa:




During the 1970s and 1980s, the Sullivan Principles represented an
effort to bring moral pressure to bear on the operations in South Africa of
large U.S. companies -- pressure to induce them to discontinue their
discriminatory labor market practices and to introduce affirmative actions for
higher wages, improved conditions, and better job opportunities among their
nonwhite employees. In this paper, we look at the workplace data between 1972
and 1984 of samples of the firms that subscribed to the Sullivan Principles.
Employment. The signatory firms expanded their nonwhite employment,
but not their white employment, much more rapidly than did the representative
firm in South African manufacturing. Typically, this was achieved through
growth while converting, at the margin, previously white jobs into nonwhite
jobs; but some of the firms achieved the nonwhite labor growth through an
unbalanced expansion that stressed the growth of traditionally nonwhite jobs.
Wage Rates. There was little evidence that nonwhite wage rates in the
signatory firms rose any more rapidly than white wage rates. Nor did nonwhite
wage rates rise any more rapidly in the signatory firms than in South African
manufacturing in general.
Management and Supervisory Positions. There was some evidence that
signatory firms increased the number of nonwhites in upper-level jobs. There
was, however, only one subset of the firms in the sample for which there was a
really substantial increase in nonwhite representation in management and
supervisory positions. For these firms, the growth in the number of nonwhites
in the top-level jobs occurred primarily through the hiring of nonwhites in




Private Pressure for Social Change in South Africa:




The horrors of apartheid have roiled the mainstream of the American
conscience for forty years, and ways to hasten its demise have been sought for
nearly as long. Not only have public confrontations with and sanctions
against South Africa been urged, but private means of fostering change have
been also attempted. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Sullivan Principles
represented an effort to bring moral pressure to bear on the operations in
South Africa of large U.S. companies -- pressure to induce them to discontinue
their discriminatory labor market practices and to introduce affirmative
actions for higher wages, improved conditions, and better job opportunities
among their nonwhite employees.
In this paper, we look at the wage and employment data of a small,
self-selected sample of the U.S. firms that subscribed to the Sullivan
Principles in order to evaluate the extent of their commitment to the
employment, wages, and advancement of their nonwhite workers. 2  Our sample
suggests that the companies espousing the Sullivan Principles did in fact
expand their nonwhite employment faster than other South African manufacturing
firms - - and their white employment no less rapidly -- which implies either
1. Department of Economics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (USA) 48109.
We are indebted to Steven Miller for research assistance, especially in the
material for Section II and in the excavation of the data for Sections III
and IV. And we thank Robin Barlow, David Gordon, and other members of the
University of Michigan Development Seminar for comments on an early draft.
2. The same data are available for a much larger sample of subscribers , indeed
for most of the signatory firms, but they were reported in confidence to
Arthur D. Little, which released only aggregated accounts of the wage and
employment activities of the reporting firms. Our efforts to incorporate
this larger sample into our work have, so far, proven unsuccessful.
that rapidly growing firms were more prone to accept the Principles or that
acceptance of the Principles was not a costly act that impeded growth of the
signatory firms. Wage rates of the signatories, however, rose no more rapidly
than did wage rates of the rest of South African manufacturing firms, for
either white or nonwhite labor, which implies that the Principles had small,
if any, impact on wage rates. Finally, the firms in our sample did not seem
to much increase the numbers of nonwhites in management and supervisory
positions. A few firms made dramatic improvements in this area, but most made
little or no progress.
The development of the Sullivan Principles, and the Principles
themselves, are outlined in Section II of the paper. In Sections III and IV,
we examine the changes in nonwhite employment and nonwhite wage rates,
respectively, of the signatory companies, and we attempt to discover the
proximate sources of these changes. These changes are compared to the
aggregate of South African manufacturing in Section V. The changes in
nonwhite employment in management and supervisory positions are examined in
Section VI, using the same procedures developed in Section III. And in
Section VII, the conclusions are brought together along with some speculations
about how the Sullivan Principles might have affected the profitability of the
signatories and how this in turn might have affected the way in which the
signatory firms implemented the Principles.
II. The Sullivan Principles
In April 1971, the Reverend Leon Sullivan, minister of the Zion
Baptist Church in Philadelphia and member of the Board of Directors of General
Motors Corporation, publicly urged G.M. to close its plants in South Africa
(New York Times, 9 April 1971, p. 45).3 Only 1.29% of the stockholders
supported this motion (NYT, 22 May 1971, p. 39). Within a year, Sullivan had
changed his view, believing that G.M. -- and other U.S. firms in South Africa
3. "The 1971 annual meeting was Sullivan's first. It was the fifty-ninth for
Charles Stewart Mott, then ninety-five, who had sat on General Motors board
since 1913. Never in all those years had the patriarchal Mott, or anybody
else, heard any G.M. director publicly dissent from any of the expressed
views of management" (Kahn, 1979, p. 138). Hereafter, New York Times is
abbreviated to NYT .
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-- should stay there if they worked to change the system (NYT, 20 May 1972, p.
42). During the next few years, he met regularly with executives of major
corporations in an effort to involve them in anti-apartheid activity.
Formal success began in March 1977 when twelve large U.S.
corporations, including G.M., agreed to implement six principles in the
operation of their South African facilities (NYT, 2 March 1977, p. IV-1). 4
The six principles, soon known as "The Sullivan Principles", were:
1. Nonsegregation of the races in all eating, comfort, and work facilities.
2. Equal and fair employment practices for all employees.
3. Equal pay for all employees doing equal or comparable work for the same
period of time.
4. Initiation and development of training programs that will prepare, in
substantial numbers, blacks and other nonwhites for supervisory,
administrative, clerical, and technical jobs.
5. An increase in the number of blacks and other nonwhites in management
and supervisory positions.
6. Improvement in quality of employees' lives outside the work environment
in such areas as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation, and
health facilities (NYT, ibid.).
This code, in the words of a New York Times editorial, "offends South Africa's
custom, but not its laws or pretensions" (NYT, 15 June 1983, p. 26).5 By the
fall of 1977, over 50 companies had endorsed the Principles; and by the
4. The other companies: American Cyanamid, Burroughs, Caltex, Citicorp, Ford,
IBM, International Harvester, Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing (3M),
Mobil, Otis, and Union Carbide.
5. That statement may not have been quite true -- many of the signatory
companies worried that they might be breaking some law or another . In
South Africa, the government has regularly empowered itself with broad
means to u'phold apartheid and then selectively utilized those powers . The
Terrorism Act, for example, makes anyone who advocates the discouragement
of foreign investment liable to the death penalty (Kahn, 1979, pp .
144-145) .
- 3 -
following summer, over 100 (NYT, 21 June 1977, p. 45, 15 Sept. 1977, p. IV-16,
6 July 1978, p. IV-5).
In July 1978, the Principles were expanded to include two new
guidelines. One, the right of nonwhites to form and belong to government-
registered unions. And two, an end to job fragmentation and restrictions on
apprenticeships open to nonwhites.6  The number of subscribers to the
Principles continued to expand, reaching 145 in the fall of 1983 (NYT, 6 Nov.
1983, p. 111-12) and a peak of 194 in the fall of 1986 (Alm and Jones, 1986,
p. 45).7
Sullivan had from the start worried about the problem of monitoring
the signatory firms - - "we needed some measurable way of determining just what
progress was being made" (NYT, 6 July 1978, p. IV-5). A program was announced
in the summer of 1978: Subscribers would submit semi-annual reports starting
in September 1978 (NYT, ibid.). Evaluations of these reports were done by
Arthur D. Little, which produced two reports on the activities of the
signatory corporations in 1979 and one each year thereafter. 8
The data requested, the forms required, and the grading system all
changed regularly over the period, 1979-86. The 1983 questionnaire, for
example, ran 55 pages, with 116 questions requiring data and essays.9 On
average, 25% of the companies were given failing grades ("needs to become more
active"), and those that passed were awarded one of two grades, "making
progress" (42%) or "making good progress" (33%).1O The exact grading system
6. Job fragmentation is the practice of dividing a skilled job done by one
white worker up into two or more less skilled -- and much less well paid --
jobs to be done by nonwhite workers.
7. A complete list of the subscribing firms and their dates of subscription is
provided in Appendix A. There are 249 firms listed there, but some of
these had withdrawn before others had signed.
8. The last report was produced in November 1986.
9. A shorter form was permitted for companies that were more than 50% owned by
South Africans and had less than 25 employees .
10. See Appendix A. The percentages in the text sentence refer to the entire
grading period, 1979-86; the percentages varied greatly from year to year.
Slightly over half of the signatories were graded at some time or another.
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was never divulged. 1 1  Fortune called it "Byzantine", claiming that "many
answers aren't graded at all" and that "on occasion ... grades have been
changed" (Sherman, 1984, pp. 168, 170). What appears to have been well known
was that conformity with the first three principles, those relating to
equality in the workplace, was a minimum condition for passing the Arthur D.
Little test. But many firms pushed time and money toward the sixth principle,
in the hope that this would earn them "Brownie points" in the scoring (ibid.,
p. 170).
Whether because of the time and cost of preparing the reports for
Arthur D. Little, because of the cost of the programs undertaken to comply
with the Principles, or because -- as Sullivan contended -- companies were
afraid of failing their progress evaluations, signatories began to drop out of
the program in the 1980s. 1 2  By November 1983, 29 of the 145 firms had
withdrawn in the sense that they failed to pay the monitoring fees of
$1,000-7,000 per year and, presumably, failed to submit regular reports (NYT,
6 Nov. 1983, p. 111-12).
Six new steps were added by Sullivan to the Principles in December
1984, and they were approved by "standing ovation" at a meeting of 119 of the
then 128 signatory firms (NYT, 13 Dec. 1984, p. IV-1). The new principles,
often called "the second phase" or "Sullivan Two", required that the
companies:
1. Use influence and support the unrestricted rights of black businesses to
locate in the urban areas of the nation.
11. Many lists of criteria, however, have been released. In addition to the
workplace. principles of nonsegregation, fair employment practices, equal
pay for equal work, and affirmative action for management training and
employment, these involved education for non-employees, community
development, and social justice.
12. Fortune estimated that the signatories spent $78 million "over the years"
on schools, housing, and other social programs, and this of course counts
neither the extra costs of higher wages and more expensive work
environments nor any cost savings owing to more rational hiring,
promo ting , and employment practices (Sherman, 1984, p . 168) . The
signatory firms themselves (134 of them) claimed that they had spent $100
million "on" the Principles ("Fleeing", 1985, p. 138). An editorial in
the New Republic stated that $230 million had been spent (Waldorf, 1987,
p. 15).
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2. Influence other companies in South Africa to follow the standards of
equal rights principles.
3. Support the freedom of mobility of black workers to seek employment
opportunities wherever they exist, and make possible provisions for
adequate housing for families of employees within the proximity of
workers' employment.
4. Support the ending of all apartheid laws.
5. Practice corporate civil disobedience against all apartheid laws and
refrain from following the practice, policies and regulations pertaining
to apartheid.
6. Use your company's financial and legal resources to assist blacks in the
equal use of all public and private amenities, such as parks, beaches,
schools, hospitals, transportation and housing. 1 3
Moreover, Sullivan Two called for the signatories to withdraw from South
Africa and support an international economic boycott of that nation if
"apartheid is not actually and in fact statutorily abolished as a system and
blacks do not have equal political rights and full citizen rights" by 31 May
1987.14
When the sun rose in June 1987 on a South Africa still under
apartheid, Sullivan called on the companies to end all commercial ties to
South Africa (NYT, 4 June 1987, p. 1). By that date, more than 100 American
firms had already sold off their South African subsidiaries (ibid.), and more
quickly followed. Between 1984 and (July) 1988, 162 U.S. companies withdrew
from South Africa. 1 5  Most of the signatories that have not withdrawn have
maintained that they intend to continue to comply with the earlier Principles.
13. The final two of these six were added in 1986 (NYT, 27 July 1986, p.
III-27).
14. The quote again is from Sullivan, ibid.
15. As of July 1988, 149 U.S. companies still had direct investments or
employees in South Africa (GAO, 1988, p. 32).
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III. Changes in Nonwhite Employment by the Signatory Firms
All signatories to the Sullivan Principles were annually required to
submit extensive information on their operations, including data on employment
by race and job category. But those data were considered confidential by
Arthur D. Little, only aggregated and summary statistics being made public in
its reports. But some of the signatories, presumably those who were proud of
their South African record, voluntarily passed on much of this information to
the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), which in turn published it
in its periodic newsletter. This is the source of our data.
The most basic labor-market aspect of the Sullivan Principles was the
call for "equal and fair employment practices". In South Africa, this means
resisting -- or ignoring -- the laws and customs of apartheid, all of which
conspire to favor the employment of whites over nonwhites. 1 6 Not only should
"fair" employment practices lead to an increase in the numbers of nonwhites at
all rungs of the job-ladder, but another of the Sullivan Principles further
called for special effort, beyond fair practices, to "increase the number of
... nonwhites in management and supervisory positions". The compliance of the
Sullivan signatories can, therefore, be very basically measured by their
ability to increase the relative numbers of nonwhites in their workplaces.
In order to examine change in nonwhite employment, we needed data on
employment by race and job category for a single company (or plant or
division) for a pair of years that was comparable across that pair of years.
In the IRRC newsletter, 33 corporate entities provided at least one such pair
of years with adequate and comparable data. Many provided more than one pair
-- for year-pairs ranging over 1972 through 1984 -- for a total of 78
observations.
16. See Iyengar and Porter, 1988, where computable general equilibrium
simulations are used to estimate the labor reallocation, wage change, and
income redistribution that would follow from a dismantling of apartheid's
controls over labor markets.
17. The firms in the sample, the years of the observations , and the exact
sources of the data are given in Appendix B. Some of the observations are
for periods before the firms signed the Sullivan Principles, some for
periods after, a distinction that we shall examine shortly. Wage data are
also available for many of the observations, and they are utilized in
Section IV. Frequently, the data distinguished between the employment of
-7-
At any moment of time, the number of workers in a particular firm
employed in job category i who are nonwhite (n) is Lin, which can be written
as the following identity:
(1) Lin = (Lin/Li)(Li/L)L,
where Li is the total number of workers, white (w) and nonwhite (n), in job
category i, and L is the total labor force of the firm.1 8  Table 1 shows, as
an example, the report of one of the firms for one pair of years. The
information contained in such a table provides the data for one observation in
our analysis of the nonwhite employment change. 1 9
The total number of nonwhite employees, Ln, is simply the sum of the
Lin across the i job rungs:
(2) Ln = Ei Lin-
What we are interested in is the change in the number of nonwhites
employed between two different points of time. 2 0 The change in the number of
nonwhite employees, ALn, can be written by differencing equation (2) after
substituting equation (1) into it:
Blacks, Coloreds, and Asians, but we have always aggregated such into
"nonwhite" on the grounds that Sullivan (usually) called equally for the
fairer treatment of all these groups.
18. Time subscripts are implicit throughout.
19. By no means did all firms provide data for every year. When there are
gaps, the closest pair of comparably formatted years is utilized as the
observation. In the example of 3M (Table 1), data were not provided (at
least in the same format) in 1981 or 1982, and hence the derived
observation refers to the three-year period, 1980-83.
20. The change in the quality of jobs opened up to nonwhites will be examined




Employment in Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing (3M), 1980 and 1983






























































































































Labor in numbers of workers.
See Appendix B for data restrictions. For example, Job
Rung F was not reported in the 1983 report, so zeros
have been entered.
(3) ALn = Ei(Lin/Li)(Li/L)A(Ln+Lw) + Ii(Lin/Li)L(Li/L)
+ i(Li/L)LA(Lin/Li) + Interact,
where Lw is the total number of white workers employed by the firm and the
final term, called "Interact", represents a collection of terms involving the
products of A's. Finally, we collect the two ALn terms on the left-hand side
of the equation:
(4) ALn = (Ei(Lin/Li)(Li/L)A(Lw) + Ei(Lin/Li)LA(Li/L)
+ i(Li/L)LA (Lin/Li) + Interact)/{l - Ei(Lin/Li) (Li/L)).
The first three terms in the numerator of the right-hand side of equation (4)
offer a decomposition of the sources of change in the number of nonwhites
employed. The first term, involving ALw, indicates the extent to which
nonwhite employment would have changed if the nonwhite labor force of the firm
had been changed at the same rate as the white part of the labor force had
changed while the job structure of employment, Li/L, had remained unchanged.
The second term, involving A(Li/L), indicates the extent to which nonwhite
employment would have changed as a result of the job structure altering so as
to favor or disfavor already nonwhite-intensive job categories. And the third
term, involving A(Lin/Li), indicates the extent to which nonwhite employment
would have changed as a result of changes in the fraction of nonwhites within
particular job categories. This equation (4), and this interpretation of its
three major components, underlie the estimates to be produced in this section.
There is a conceptually uninteresting but practically important
problem with. the application of equation (4) to the actual data of two
different points of time: at which of the two points are we to evaluate the
elements that precede the A terms? We choose, arbitrarily but hardly without
precedent, to evaluate them at the arithmetic average of the earlier and the
later years. Not only does this choice contain a goodly amount of common
sense, but it also insures that the "Interact" term in the numerator of
equation (4) involves only the product of all three A terms - - there remain no
products of two of the three A terms. Precisely, the "Interact" term is then
- 9 -
(5) Interact = 0.25{(iA(Lin/Li)A(Li/L)AL}.
There remain two further steps to producing the estimates. One,
equation (4) is divided throughout by the earlier year value for nonwhite
employment (Ln) so as to put the information into a percentage growth format.
And two, since the time gap between available reports differs among
observations, both between firms and between different sets of information by
the same firm, all the estimates of nonwhite labor change are converted into
equivalent instantaneous per annum growth rates.
By means of equation (4), the change in nonwhite labor for each
observation can be decomposed into three effects:
1. The balanced change effect (i.e. the first term in equation (4),
involving ALW). This indicates how much change would have occurred in
the nonwhite labor force if its expansion (or contraction) had taken
place at the same percentage rate as did that of white employment.
2. The job structure effect (i.e. the second term in equation (4),
involving A(Li/L). This indicates the extent to which nonwhite
employment changed because less skilled (i.e. nonwhite-labor-intensive)
jobs changed more or less rapidly than did the more skilled (i.e. white-
labor-intensive) jobs.
3. The nonwhitening effect (i.e. the third term in equation (4), involving
A(Lin/Li). This indicates the extent to which nonwhite employment
changed because the number of nonwhites changed as a fraction of the
total employment within job categories. Such changes, where they
occurred, could have taken place either because of the introduction of
fairer employment practices or, more dramatically, because of the
initiation of affirmative-action measures.
The average per annum growth rate of nonwhite labor in the sample is
shown in Table 2. Both the unweighted average and the average weighted by
each firm's start-of-period nonwhite employment are given. The division into
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Table 2
Division of Nonwhite Labor Change into Three Effects
c
Change in Variable Unweighted Average Weighted Average
Nonwhite Employment 4.39% 4.79%
Effects:
Balanced Change 0.97% -0.19%
Job Structure -3.68 -0.95
Nonwhitening 5.53 5.49
Table 3
Distribution of Nonwhite Employment Change and Its Effects










































































the three effects is then given, again for both the unweighted and the
weighted averages of each of the effects.21
The firms in this sample were, on average, taking significant steps to
"nonwhiten" their workplaces.22 The growth rate of nonwhite employment in
these firms was more than completely due to the nonwhitening effect, i.e. the
increased fraction of nonwhites in particular job categories. The growth rate
due to the balanced change effect -- i.e. the growth rate that would have
occurred if nonwhite labor had grown at the same rate as white labor -- was
on average less than one percent per annum (insignificantly different from
zero, and indeed negative for the weighted average); and the growth rate due
to the job structure effect was on average negative by either weighting system
(and significantly so for the unweighted average).
A simple look at these averages of Table 2 suggests that most of these
firms implemented their Sullivan sympathies by hiring few whites, perhaps
changing the job structure slightly toward the more skilled jobs, and chiefly
employing nonwhites whenever and wherever expanded employment was called for.
But this inference is misleading, as a closer examination of the three effects
for particular observations will disclose. The three effects are not similar
among firms, and there are strong patterns among the effects.
These relationships are most clearly seen by sorting the observations
on the job structure effect, from highest to lowest. Table 3 shows the
(unweighted) average values of the three effects and the nonwhite employment
growth variable within each of the sextiles from highest to lowest job
21. Note that the averages of the three effects do not add up exactly to the
average growth rate of nonwhite labor. This is partly due to the omission
of the "Interact" effect and is partly due to the arithmetic fact that the
sum of the growth rates of several variables does not equal the growth
rate of the sum of those variables. In Table 2, the average "Interact"
effects are -0.34% and -0.17% (for the unweighted and weighted,
respectively); the growth-rate-sum problem accounts for the other 1.92%
and 0.61% (for unweighted and weighted, respectively) of the overall
differences.
22. Of the unweighted averages, all are significantly different from zero
except the balanced change effect.
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structure effect. 2 3  The most notable feature of Table 3 is the inverse
relationship between the job structure effect and the nonwhitening effect.
Figure 1 visually displays this inverse relation in a scatter diagram of the
two effects for the entire sample of 78 observations.2 4
Only in the third sextile (and to somewhat lesser extent in the fourth
sextile) of Table 3 do we see the sort of firm that the averages of Table 2
suggested. In these two sextiles - - and only in these two - - are there indeed
firms that hire few whites, change the job structure little (and toward the
greater use of skilled labor), and hire mostly nonwhites when they want to
expand their labor force. Sextiles 1 and 2 and sextiles 5 and 6 tell of very
different hiring patterns:
Sextiles 1 and 2. These firms, with very large percentage growth rate
in their nonwhite employment, have tended to achieve this through the
job structure effect. They have expanded their employment generally but
have principally expanded in jobs that were already nonwhite-intensive.
Notice that within job categories, there is little or no tendency toward
nonwhitening. While this pattern of employment expansion results in a
gratifying increase in nonwhite employment, there is no upgrading of
nonwhites into middle and top level jobs implicit in it. Rather, it is
an unbalanced expansion, with emphasis on the traditionally nonwhite and
low-skilled jobs.
Sextiles 5 and 6. These firms have produced the worst record of
nonwhite employment growth, but they have done the most upgrading of
nonwhite labor. The nonwhitening effect is very large among these
firms, and the job structure effect indicates that the traditionally
nonwhite, low-skilled jobs have been contracted relative to the white-
labor-dominated, high-skill jobs. White employment as well as nonwhite
23. Sextiles are a convenient division because there are then exactly 13
observations in each sextile.
24. The correlation coefficients among the three effects are: -0.44 between
the effects displayed in Figure 1; also negative, -0.35, between the
balanced change effect and the nonwhitening effect; and positive, +0.31,
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employment has contracted, although the percentage rate of decline is
generally smaller for whites.
Thus, three very different kinds of firms - - with respect to their
employment practices (and general rate of expansion) - - have provided data for
the IRRC-based sample. While different, they nevertheless share reason to be
proud of their accomplishments, which is probably why they self-selected
themselves into this sample. Firms in the sample show either dramatic
upgrading of nonwhites into traditionally white positions but declines in
overall nonwhite employment (Sextiles 5 and 6), or they show dramatic
increases in nonwhite employment with little if any upgrading of nonwhites
(Sextiles 1 and 2), or they show modest amounts of each, employment growth and
upgrading for nonwhites (Sextiles 3 and 4).
We examined the growth rates of nonwhite labor and the three effects
with respect to two other kinds of variables: 1) the extent to which the firm
was already relatively heavily endowed with white or nonwhite labor at the
start of the period of the observation; and 2) whether the firm had yet signed
the Sullivan Principles and, if so, how much time had elapsed since its
subscription. Small, or no, relation was noted among any of these. With
respect to the former variables, this is at first a little surprising. One
would think that firms that were initially very "white" would experience more
"nonwhitening" through fair employment practices and/or would have more scope
for affirmative action.2 5 But the absence of any relation between the act of
signing or the date of signing the Sullivan Principles and the employment
patterns suggests the likely answer. The firms in this sample were already
practicing enlightened employment policies in the early 1970s -- at least, as
enlightened as their perception of continued and profitable South African
operation permitted - - and their subscription to the Sullivan Principles
apparently did not lead to any further (or different) liberalization of their
hiring policies.
How "enlightened" were the employment policies of these self-selected
firms? That is a tough question, to which we will return in the final section
25. The data, however, do not show that -- the rate of growth of white labor
and the rate of growth of nonwhite labor were both somewhat greater for
the firms that initially had the larger white-to-nonwhite labor ratios.
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of the paper. But we can now see how enlightened Arthur D. Little thought
these companies were. During the entire Arthur D. Little grading period
(1979-86), the observations in our sample received an average grade of 1.51,
compared to an average grade for all firms graded of 2.08.26 118 of the 146
firms that were ever graded received average grades worse than 1.51, so the
firms in our sample were clearly seen by Arthur D. Little as superior
implementers of the Principles.
Was there any relation between the three effects that we have measured
and the grades awarded by Arthur D. Little? Yes, and always in the expected
direction: Better (i.e. lower on our scale) Arthur D. Little grades were
received by firms that had higher balanced change effects, or higher job
structure effects, or higher nonwhitening effects. But the relationship was
only significant for the nonwhitening effect (a correlation coefficient of
-0.24 between the firm's average Arthur D. Little grade, on our one-to-three
scale, and the estimated nonwhitening effect of the observation in the
sample). This suggests that the Arthur D. Little evaluators might have been
particularly alert to increases in nonwhite employment that came from
converting white jobs to nonwhite jobs (as compared to increasing both whites
and nonwhites in proportion or increasing nonwhite employment in the
traditional nonwhite jobs). But there was an equally strong correlation
between the per annum growth rate of nonwhite employment (in the sample) and
the firm's grade, so an alternative explanation of the grading process is
equally tenable, that the Arthur D. Little evaluators might have simply looked
at the rate of growth of nonwhite employment in the firms.
2 7 In fact, none of
26. This scoring system is ours, not Arthur D. Little's. We gave 1 to "making
good progress", 2 to "making (acceptable) progress", and 3 to "needs to
become more active" (see Appendix A); we then averaged all the grades the
firm ever received. These averages for the firms in our sample ranged
from 1.00 (Citicorp and IBM) to 2.57 (Borg-Warner). Note that the 2.08 is
the average grade of all the firms graded, not the average grade awarded
(1. 91) - - firms that received poor grades understandably tended to submit
to the grading process less often.
27. By "equally strong" is meant the same correlation coefficient, -0.24.
This is surprising in light of the sextile data of Table 3, but the
correlation coefficient between the rate of growth of nonwhite employment
and the nonwhitening effect is positive, +0.28.
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these correlations is very strong - - no convincing clues about the Arthur D.
Little grading criteria are uncovered. 2 8
IV. Changes in Nonwhite Wage Rates in Signatory Firms
"Equal and fair employment practices", demanded by the Sullivan
Principles, presumably meant that the signatory firms would reduce the
barriers to nonwhite employment and advancement in their workplaces. The
result of such a reduction of barriers should appear not only in increased
employment of nonwhites but also in increased wage rates for nonwhites. In
this section, we look at nonwhite wage rates for our self-selected sample of
firms. 2 9
We make use of the fact that, for many of the volunteered
observations, the average wage rate is also provided, by race and by job
classification. For the estimates of this section, construction of an
observation requires a comparably formatted pair of years for a firm with
data, by race and job-rung, for both employment and average wage rate. Many
fewer firms provided adequate wage information, and the sample size drops from
the 78 of Section III to 18 in this section.30 Table 4 shows, as an example,
28. When we compare the average Arthur D. Little scores over each of the
sextiles of Table 3, the differences are small, in both the unweighted and
the weighted sample.
29. Everything in this section is done in nominal wage rates, rather than
real, since we are primarily interested in comparisons with white wage
rates. But the interested reader can readily make the translation. For
the years covered by this sample, 1972-84, the South African Consumer
Price Index rose between 10% and 15% in every year (and at an average over
the period of 12.3% per annum). Of course, one must remember that the
(only official) South African CPI is for a white family's consumption
basket, and the extreme racial income inequality makes that an equivocal
deflator for nonwhites.
30. The data come from twelve different corporate entities, with some
providing multiple observations. In a few cases, the wage information was
in a slightly different format, giving for each job rung, the maximum wage
rate, the minimum wage rate, the average wage rate (for both whites and
nonwhites together), the percentage of whites earning above-average wage
rates, and the percentage of nonwhites earning above-average wage rates.
From this, we were able to make what we felt was a reasonable estimate of
the average wage by race for the job category. Some firms provided the
wage data in U.S. dollars; these were converted back into Rand in order to
- 15 -
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Labor in numbers of workers; average wage
Blanks in the wage columns indicate there
in that job rung and race group.
in Rand per month.
were no employees
the report of one of the firms on its average wage and employment by race and
job category for a pair of nearby years.
The average wage in job category i of a nonwhite worker is written Yin
and that of a white worker is written Yiw. The total wage earnings of
nonwhite labor are the product of the average salary of nonwhites (Yn) and the
total number of nonwhite employees (La). This is simply
(6) YnLn = EiYinLin-
In a similar procedure to that used with the labor data of Section III,
equation (6) can be expanded into an identity involving a series of ratios:
(7) YnLn = Ei(Yin/Yi)(Yi/Y)YLin,
where
(8) Yi = (YinLin + YiwLiw)/Li and
(9) Y = ZiYiLi/L.
In words, the two parenthetical ratios on the right-hand side of equation (7)
have the following meaning: (Yin/Yi) is the ratio of the average nonwhite wage
at job rung i to the average overall wage in i; and (Yi/Y) is the ratio of the
average overall wage at job rung i to the average overall wage in the firm.
Differencing equation (7), and rearranging terms, we get
(10) AYn = {Gi(Yin/Yi) (Yi/Y)LinAY + Ei(Yin/Yi)YLinA(Yi/Y
+ Ei(Yi/Y)YLinA(Yin/Yi) + Zi(Yin/Yi) (Yi/Y)YALin
- YnALn + Interact}/Ln,
keep them in comparable , nominal Rand terms . See Appendix B for further
discussion of the data.
- 16 -
where the final term, "Interact", again represents a collection of terms
involving the products of A's. Equation (10) is not quite ready to apply to
the data because the first term on the right-hand side, involving AY,
implicitly contains the variable of the left-hand side, AYn, within it.
Writing
(11) YL = YnLn + YwLw,
differencing (11), substituting for the A Y term in equation (10), and
isolating the AYn terms on the left, we get
(12) AYn = (Ei(Yin/Yi)(Yi/Y)LinAYw + Ei(Yin/Yi)YLinA(Yi/Y)
+ Zi(Yi/Y)YLinA(Yin/Yi) + AL terms + Interact}/
{L n-(Ln/L) Ei (Yin/Yi) (Yi/Y) Lin },
where the "AL terms" contain terms involving ALw, ALn, and ALin. In the
empirical work of this section, we report only the aggregate of all these
labor change effects.
The four terms in the numerator of the right-hand side of equation
(12), other than the "Interact" term, provide a breakdown of the sources of
change in the average wage rate of the firm's nonwhite employees. The first
term, involving AYw, indicates the extent to which the average nonwhite wage
rate would have changed if it had moved proportionately with the overall
average white wage of the firm while the relative structure of wage rates,
Yi/Y and Yin/ i, and the relative structure of employment, Li/L and Lin/Li,
had all remained unchanged. The second term, involving A(Yin/Yi), indicates
the extent to which the average nonwhite wage would have changed as a result
of a change in the ratio of the nonwhite to the overall wage rate within
different job categories. The third term, involving A(Yi/Y), indicates the
extent to which the average nonwhite wage would have changed as a result of
changes in the wage structure among jobs so as to favor or disfavor nonwhite-
intensive jobs. And the fourth term, involving a collection of employment-
change terms, indicates the extent to which nonwhite wages changed because of
the ways in which employment shifted, among j ob categories and between races .
- 17 -
This equation (12), and this interpretation of its four major components,
underlie the estimates in this section.
Again, we arbitrarily evaluate the non-A elements of equation (12) at
the arithmetic average of the earlier and the later years. And again, this
procedure insures that the "Interact" term of equation (12) involves only the
product of three A terms - - there remain no products of two of the three A
terms (or the product of all four). 3 1
Again, there are two further steps. One, equation (12) is divided
throughout by the earlier year value for the average nonwhite wage rate (Yn)
so as to put the information into a percentage growth format. And two, since
the time gap between the available reports differs among observations, both
between firms and between different reports of the same firm, all the
percentage growth estimates are converted into equivalent instantaneous per
annum growth rates.
By means of equation (12), the change in the average nonwhite wage for
each observation can be decomposed into four effects:
1. The balanced change effect (i.e. the first term in equation (12),
involving AYw). This indicates how much change would have occurred in
the average nonwhite wage rate if its growth (or decline) had occurred
at the same percentage rate as did the average wage rate of white
workers.
2. The wage structure effect (i.e. the second term in equation (12),
involving A(Yi/Y)). This indicates the extent to which the average
nonwhite wage changed because of relative wage changes among the various
31. Precisely, the "Interact" of equations (10) and (12) is
(13) Interact =
0.25 {Ei(Yin/Yi)A(Yi/Y)AYALin + Ei(Yi/Y)A(Yin/Yi)AYALin
+ EiYA(Yin/Yi)A(Y i/Y)ALin + EiLinA(Yin/Yi)A(Y i/Y)-
For completeness, the various "AL terms" are precisely
(14) A L terms =
(-Y[Zi(Yin/Yi) (Yi/Y) (Lin/L] - Yn[1- Ei( in/ i) (Yi/Y) (Lin/L]})ALn
+ {[Y-]E(ini(Yi/Y) (Lin/L)})AL, + {Y~i(Yin i) (Yi/Y)})ALin.
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jobs. Nonwhites benefit to the extent that the relatively low-skill,
low-wage, nonwhite-intensive job rungs received the largest wage
increases.
3. The nonwhite wage effect (i.e. the third term in equation (12),
involving A(Yin/Yi)). This indicates the extent to which the average
nonwhite wage changed because nonwhite wages changed differently (in
percentage terms) from white wages within job categories.
4. The employment effect (i.e. the fourth term in equation (12), involving
various AL terms. 3 2  This indicates how much the average nonwhite wage
rate changed because of changes in the structure of employment. 3 3
The unweighted average per annum growth rate of the nominal nonwhite
wage rate is 11.29%, just under the average rate of inflation of the CPI in
the late 1970s. In Table 5, both the unweighted and weighted (by start-of-
period nonwhite employment) average nonwhite wage rate growth are presented.
The weighted average growth rate of nonwhite wages is 16.83%, well above the
inflation rate in this period. The division into the four effects is also
given, again for both the unweighted and the weighted averages of each of the
effects.3 4
Only the balanced change effect is much different from zero, and it
accounts for almost the entirety of the change in nonwhite wages.35 What
32. I.e. ALw, ALn, and ALin. See equation (14).
33. One must be wary here since changes in the employment structure inevitably
also have a direct effect on the average wage rates -- such as Yi, Yn, Yw'
and Y.
34. The sum of the averages of the four effects does not equal the average
nonwhite wage rate rise. Again, this is due to the absence of the
"Interact" effect (0.52% and 0.25% for the unweighted and weighted
averages, respectively) and the fact that the sum of growth rates does not
equal the growth rate of the sum (which causes differences of 1.80% and
-0.64% for the unweighted and weighted averages, respectively).
35. None of the unweighted averages of the other three effects are
significantly different from zero, and the weighted averages are all even
closer to zero. The sizeable differences between the unweighted and the
weighted figures in Table 5 is due to two outlier observations (Kellogg),
where few nonwhite workers were involved.
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Table 5
Division of Nonwhite Wage Rate Change into Four Effects
Change in Variable Unweighted Average Weighted Average
Nonwhite Wage Rate 11.29% 16.83%
Effects:
Balanced Change 12.62% 14.50%
Wage Structure -0.90 -0.08
Nonwhite Wage 3.28 1.20
Employment -6.03 1.60
Table 6
Distribution of Nonwhite Wage Rate Change and Its Effects
(sorted on descending Balanced Change Effects)
Nonwhite Balanced Wage Nonwhite
Wage Change Structure Wage E



































these averages are saying is that movements in nonwhite wage rates in these
firms paralleled, percentagewise, the movements in white wage rates. Wage
rate increases were not larger in the predominantly nonwhite job categories;
within job rungs, nonwhite wage rates did not rise at a faster rate than white
wage rates; and employment shifts did not occur in such a way as to raise the
average nonwhite wage rate.
In short, Table 5 suggests that the typical firm in this sample
changed its real wage rates during the decade from the mid-1970s to the
mid-1980s in across-the-board fashion. But the averages hide an interesting
diversity of behavior. While the three effects other than the balanced change
effect are small on average, they are not uniformly small for individual firms
in the sample, and several patterns can be discerned.
These patterns can be most clearly seen by sorting the observations on
the balanced change effect, from highest to lowest. Table 6 shows the
(unweighted and weighted) average values of the growth rates of the average
nonwhite wage rate and of the four effects within each of the terciles from
highest to lowest balanced change effect. 3 6  There are two interesting things
to be noticed in Table 6. One, only the middle of the three sets of tercile
averages look much like the overall sample averages (given in Table 5). And
two, the wage structure effect is strongly inversely related to the balanced
change effect -- this can also be seen in Figure 2, a scatter diagram of the
two effects for the entire sample of 18 observations. 3 7
The wage rate story of the first and third of the terciles:
Tercile 1. These firms, with a very large percentage growth rate in
their nonwhite wage rates, have an even larger percentage growth rate in
their white wage rates. The wage structure effect tells us that the
wage rises were largest in the white-labor-intensive job rungs. This is
36. With only 18 observations, no more than a threefold division seems
sensible; terciles are also convenient because they place six observations
in each part.
37. The correlation coefficient between the two effects is -0.86 (-0.66 if the
outlier observation is removed). The other correlation coefficients among
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a paradoxical pattern if we are trying to judge these firms for their
Sullivan efforts - - they display the highest nonwhite wage increases in
the sample, but these increases have been bought by raising white wages
and the wages of white-intensive jobs even more.
Tercile 3. For this group of firms, white wage rates rose very little,
and wage increases were largest in the low-wage jobs. Beyond that, the
information conveyed by the unweighted and weighted averages is very
different, and we should not speculate extensively. 3 8  What is clear
here is that these firms were doing what Sullivan had hoped for, either
through freeing labor markets or through affirmative action - - raising
nonwhite wage rates relative to white wage rates by increasing the wage
rates of the low-skilled, nonwhite-labor-intensive jobs.
The stories of the terciles are interesting and suggestive, but it
must be remembered that there are only six observations in each tercile and
that none of the unweighted averages reported in Table 6 for the wage
structure effect, the nonwhite wage effect, or the employment effect is
significantly different from zero.
We next looked at the rates of growth of the nonwhite wage and the
four effects alongside of two other variables: 1) the degree to which the
labor force of the firm was relatively "white" at the start of the observation
period; and 2) how much time had elapsed since the firm had signed the
Sullivan Principles.39 The higher the ratio of white to nonwhite labor at the
start of the period, the lower the rate of growth of nonwhite wage rates (at
the 99% level of significance). This suggests that these firms were more
troubled by the need to justify nonwhite raises to their white workers than by
the cost effects of such raises. That the longer the firm had subscribed to
the Principles the greater the growth rate of nonwhite wages (significant at
90%) suggests that firms learned to make these justifications or that the
38. The difference between the unweighted and the weighted averages is
accounted for by the very atypical data for one very small firm.
39. A duimmy variable to indicate whether or not the firm had signed at the
time of the observation was inappropriate. All but two of the firms in
this sample had.
- 21 -
white workers learned to accept the nonwhite raises. 4 0 No other relationships
among these effects and variables were significant at as high a level as
90%.41
V. Comparison of Signatory Firms with All South African Manufacturing
In Sections III and IV, we have seen that our sample of firms that
signed the Sullivan Principles behaved diversely with respect to both nonwhite
employment and nonwhite wage rates. This discovery of diversity of reaction
is in itself interesting, indicating that firms could respond to Sullivan's
call in different ways. But nothing so far has begun to answer the most
interesting question: Did signatory firms behave "better" than other, non-
signatory South African companies? We turn now to this question.
Ideally, we would like a control group of non-signatory companies that
"look like" the signatory firms in our sample. Such an ideal is of course
logically impossible, for, if they indeed looked exactly like the signatory
firms, they too would have signed the Principles. 4 2 Practical problems abound
as well. As a plausible proxy, we will use the entire South African
manufacturing sector, fully recognizing that such a control group is quite
imperfect. The composition of firm sizes and firm activities is very
different between the Sullivan sample and the totality of South African
manufacturing -- as one example of this divergence, not all the signatory
firms are in manufacturing.43
40. Of course, there are other possible explanations. One is that the early
Sullivan signers were more ardent supporters of the Principles than later,
possibly reluctant, signers.
41. There were only insignificant relationships between the grades awarded by
Arthur D. Little and the nonwhite wage growth rate or the four effects
calculated here.
42. Further, since our sample is self-selected, we would ideally need a
similarly self-selected control group, but such a group would necessarily
select itself on different criteria.
43. That the signatory firms' data are included also in the data of the
control group is not really a problem, since the Sullivan signatories
comprised so small a part of the entirety of South African manufacturing.
Only in one year (1981 in the larger sample of Section III) does the
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Nonwhite employment grew slowly in South African manufacturing, as did
white employment, during the years in question, 1972-1985.44 Depending on how
one calculates the exact growth rate, white and nonwhite employment each
increased between 1.15% and 1.42% during those years.45 But the growth rates
vary greatly between different years. Employment growth rates of both races
were much lower in the years 1977-1979 and 1982-1985, the very years from
which most of the data of the sample used in Section III comes. So the
employment growth rates in all South African manufacturing used for comparison
with our Section III sample of Sullivan signatories averages the growth rates
of the same years as the signatory data.
The comparison is made in Table 7. White employment in the signatory
firms grew very much like the white employment of all South African
manufacturing, something less than one percent per annum for the years covered
by the sample of signatories. But the nonwhite employment grew much more
rapidly -- between four and five percent per annum in the signatory firms on
average, compared to something less than one percent for all South African
manufacturing. On average, the self-selected Sullivan signatories in our
sample expanded their employment much more rapidly than South African
manufacturing as a whole, and they did it almost entirely with nonwhite labor.
Wage rates in South African manufacturing rose somewhat faster than
inflation over the period, 1972-1985, and somewhat faster for nonwhites than
whites. Depending on how one calculates the average, nominal white wage rates
averaged a 12.5-13.5% growth rate over this period, and nominal nonwhite wage
employment of the sample firms comprise as much as one percent of the
South African manufacturing total.
44. The sample of Sullivan signatories provides data from various of the years
between 1972 and 1985.
45. Three methods of calculation were applied: a simple average of the annual
growth rates (see Table B3 in Appendix B); the implied growth rate from
the 1972 figure to the 1985 figure; and the trend coefficient estimated by
regressing the natural log of employment on time, for the years 1972-1985.
All three estimates, for each of white and nonwhite employment, are
between 1.15% and 1.42%.
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Table 7
Employment Growth of Signatory Firms and All South African Manufacturing




All South African Manufacturing:
Nonwhite Employment
White Employment











The averages for the signatory firms are from Table 2.
The weighted averages are weighted by the signatory firms'
start-of-period nonwhite employment.
Table 8
Wage Rate Growth of Signatory Firms and All South African Manufacturing




All South African Manufacturing:
Nonwhite Wage Rate
White Wage Rate









Notes: 1. The averages for the signatory firms are from Table 5.
2. The weighted averages are weighted by the signatory firms'
start-of-period nonwhite employment.
rates averaged a 15.1-16.4% growth rate. 4 6 But the sample of signatory firms
to which we are going to compare all manufacturing refers to years of
unusually high wage growth, so here (again) the average for all manufacturing
weights each year's growth rate by the frequency of appearance of the year in
the signatory sample. Average nominal wage rate growth is shown in Table 8,
for the signatory firms and for all South African manufacturing, by race.
Focus on the weighted averages since the unweighted averages are much
influenced by two small outlier observations. 4 7  It is clear that the sample
of Sullivan signatories averaged wage rate increases for each race that were
very similar to those experienced by all South African manufacturing. 4 8
For all South African manufacturing, there is some evidence that firms
tended either to increase nonwhite wages at above-average rates or to increase
the nonwhite fraction of the labor force at above-average rates, but not
both. 4 9  It would be interesting to explore this hypothesis for the Sullivan
signatories, but the size of the sample of Section IV precludes it. In any
case, for those few observations of signatories, such behavior is not
apparent.
In short, the Sullivan signatories, according to the evidence of the
self-selected samples, behaved very much like typical non-signatory South
African manufacturing firms in their wage and employment growth patterns
except in one respect. The Sullivan signatories increased their nonwhite
employment at a much faster pace -- at 4-5% per annum compared to 0-1% for the
average manufacturing firm in South Africa.
46. The same three methods of calculation were used as with employment
earlier.
47. Small in that few nonwhites are employed (less than twenty in each
observation).
48. The consumer price index (OPI) rose an average of 13.3% per annum (for the
years covered by the signatory observations for both the weighted and the
unweighted samples), which means that real wage rates increased 1-2% per
annum for whites and 3-4% per annum for nonwhites, both for the signatory
sample and for all manufacturing.
49. Over the period, 1960-1977 (Porter, 1984, pp. 135 f).
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VI. Principle V -- Management and Supervisory Positions in Signatory Firms
The original Sullivan Principles required signatories to effect "an
increase in the number of blacks and other nonwhites in management and
supervisory positions." 5 0 Information about the signatory firms' efforts with
respect to these highly skilled jobs was reported in the Arthur D. Little
questionnaires under the heading, "Principle V", and many of the firms made
this information public through the IRRC.51
Table 9 shows, as an example, the report of one such firm for one pair
of years on its management and supervisory positions by race and by employment
category. We have divided the change in nonwhite employees for each
observation in exactly the same way as in Section III52 into three effects: 1)
the balanced change effect, which indicates how much change would have
occurred in the number of nonwhite employees in management and supervisory
positions if the change had occurred at the same percentage rate as that of
white employees in these jobs; 2) the job structure effect, which indicates
the extent to which these nonwhite employees changed because of differential
changes in the growth of employment in white-intensive and nonwhite-intensive
job categories; and 3) the nonwhitening effect, which indicates how much such
nonwhite employment changed because the number of nonwhite employees changed
as a percentage of the total number of employees within these management and
supervisory categories.
The average per annum growth rate of nonwhite employment in the sample
is shown in Table 10. Both the unweighted average and the average weighted by
each firm's start-of-period nonwhite employees are given. The division into
50. Given the state of nonwhite education in South Africa, this amounted to a
requirement not just to employ nonwhite workers in such positions but also
to provide the training necessary for them to perform these jobs.
51. Our source for these data is, again, the IRRC newsletters since the Arthur
D. Little material remains confidential. The data from the IRRC yielded
24 pairs of years, spread over eight firms and twelve divisions. For the
data of this section, comparability across observations was not a problem;
the data were reported for the same job categories (listed in Table 9) and
over the same years (1977-1978) by all the firms in the sample used in
this section.
52. And specifically, by equation (4).
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Table 9
Management/Supervisory Jobs by Race in Masonite
January 1977
Training Rung (i) Lin Li Li
.7 Estcourt Division, 1977-1978
January 1978
Lin Liz Li
Management and Official 1 11 12
Professional 4 32 36
Supervisor 41 46 87
Artisan 0 2 2
Technician 3 3 6
Clerical 87 10 97
Management Trainee 0 0 0
Total 136 104 240
Notes: 1. Labor in numbers of employees.



























Division of Nonwhite Management Change into Three Effects
Change in Variable Unweighted Average Weighted Average
Nonwhite Employment 15.22% 11.21%
Effects:
Balanced Change 4.40% 6.27%
Job Structure -2.67 -13.03
Nonwhitening 11.57 12.49
the three effects is then given, again for both the unweighted and the
weighted averages of each of the effects.53 Although none of the effects is
significantly different from zero, the double-digit size of the growth rates
of nonwhite employment in these jobs and of the nonwhitening effect certainly
suggests that, on average, firms expanded their nonwhite management and
supervisory employment by switching from white to nonwhite labor in these
categories, exactly the result that the Principles were designed to achieve. 5 4
Indeed, the close relationship between the nonwhitening effect and the
resulting rate of change in the numbers of nonwhites in this subset of jobs
can be seen in Figure 3, where the two variables are shown on a scatter
diagram. The 45-degree line is drawn to indicate the near equality of these
two variables throughout the sample. The correlation coefficient is +0.92.55
Further insight can be gained by dividing the 24 observations into
terciles, sorting on descending nonwhitening effects. This is done in Table
11. Most of the big change in nonwhite management and supervisory employment
occurs in the top tercile of the observations, and that change is clearly
driven by the nonwhitening effect. Thus, the conclusion of the previous
paragraph should be tempered somewhat -- a few of the firms in this sample
made large strides in nonwhite employment in top positions, essentially by
employing nonwhites where they had previously employed whites. But the other
two thirds of the firms (i.e. Terciles 2 and 3) seemed to have changed their
53. Note that here again the averages of the three effects do not add up
exactly to the average growth rate of nonwhite labor. This is partly due
to the omission of the "Interact" effect (see equation (5)) and is partly
due to the arithmetic fact that the sum of the growth rates of several
variables does not equal the growth rate of the sum of those variables.
In Table .10, the average "Interact" effects are -0.04% and 0.06% (for the
unweighted and weighted, respectively); the growth-rate-sum problem
accounts for the other 1.96% and 5.42% (for unweighted and weighted,
respectively) of the overall differences.
54. The large (negative) job structure effect in the weighted sample is driven
almost entirely by one job category in one firm. It is the fourth (down)
job category in Table 9, Artisans in the Estcourt Division of Masonite.
There an all-white job category (two of two were white) in 1977 was
increased 23-fold by 1978, while the overall numbers of workers in
management and supervisory jobs increased by barely one fourth.
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Table 11
Distribution of Nonwhite Change and Its Effects












































top-level hiring procedures little, if at all.56 In terms of Figure 3, this
is seen simply by noting that some two thirds of the points in the scatter lie
around, or to the left of and below, the origin. Such points indicate little
change in the racial structure of the upper-level employment in these firms.
VII. Summary and Conclusions
We have looked at samples of the firms in South Africa that subscribed
to the Sullivan Principles. While the samples are all small and self-
selected, and hence the findings no more than suggestive, the results appear
clear:
Employment. The signatory firms in the sample expanded their nonwhite
employment, but not their white employment, much more rapidly than did
the representative firm in South African manufacturing. Typically, this
was achieved through growth while converting, at the margin, previously
white jobs into nonwhite jobs; but some of the firms achieved the
nonwhite labor growth through an unbalanced expansion that stressed the
growth of traditionally nonwhite jobs.
Wage Rates. There was little evidence that nonwhite wage rates in the
signatory firms rose any more rapidly than white wage rates. Nor did
nonwhite wage rates rise any more rapidly in the signatory firms than in
South African manufacturing in general.
Management and Supervisory Positions. There was some evidence that
signatory firms increased the number of nonwhites in upper-level jobs.
There was, however, only one subset of the firms in the sample for which
there was a really substantial increase in nonwhite representation in
management and supervisory positions. For these firms, the growth in
the number of nonwhites in the top-level jobs occurred primarily through
the hiring of nonwhites in place of whites. For the rest of the firms
in the sample, no such change appeared.
56. Indeed, in the third tercile, the growth of employment of whites -- i.e.
the balanced change effect - - greatly exceeded the growth of employment of
nonwhites in these jobs.
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These results are hardly surprising when we recall the pressures that
apartheid puts on firms in South Africa. On the one hand, businesses benefit
by being permitted to utilize a pool of low-skilled but very low-paid labor
whose low wage rates are fostered by the whole system of apartheid. On the
other hand, the inefficiencies of the labor markets, and especially the
pressures firms face to forego employing promising black workers in high-
skilled jobs, impose costs on South African businesses. When firms sign the
Sullivan Principles, they are essentially promising to give up some of the
benefits -- if it means paying higher wages to black workers -- in return for
being "forced" to reduce some of the costs -- namely, those related to the
labor-market inefficiencies. We should not be surprised to find that the
signatory firms were more deft at taking advantage of the cost-reduction
aspects of the Sullivan Principles than they were at bearing the burdens of
the benefit-reduction aspects.
The changes in the racial aspects of the signatory firms' employment
is an example of the part of apartheid that capitalists have always wanted to
thwart. Firms have been prevented by formal and informal pressures from
hiring cheap and talented blacks for certain jobs that have been in effect
reserved for expensive, marginal whites. Subscribing to the Sullivan
Principles has given these firms an excuse to accelerate the kinds of changes
that it has long been in their interests to make.
Paying higher wages to blacks, however, is never in the firm's
interest. 5 7 That signatory firms have not differed dramatically from the rest
of South African manufacturing in the rate at which their nonwhite wage rates
have risen is not surprising. To use nonwhites in place of marginal whites
while maintaining the old wage structure is to reap the gains without paying
the costs. If subscribing to the Sullivan Principles was actually turned into
a profit-generating move, this would explain not only the willingness of so
many firms to subscribe but also the fact that their overall employment, and
presumably output, grew more rapidly than the average of all South African
manufacturing firms. Big and important as the signatories were, they did not
57. It is sometimes argued that higher wages for nonwhites are desirable in
South Africa in order to expand the markets for domestically produced
consumer goods, but, whatever the merits of that argument, it is never in
the interest of any individual firm to take the lead in such wage changes.
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comprise a sufficiently large part of the demand for nonwhite labor in South
Africa that their altered racial employment demands would, by themselves,
significantly change the white-black wage differentials.
With respect to the addition of nonwhites at the management and
supervisory levels, the profit motives of the firms are clearly mixed. Such
changes involve benefits insofar as there are talented nonwhite employees
available who can do these jobs better and cheaper than the current white job-
holders can. This motive for change is most forceful at the lowest rung of
the management ladder, where the best nonwhites are precluded from rising and
the least talented whites reside. On the other hand, there are costs to these
changes. One, given the state of nonwhite education in South Africa, the
cheapness of nonwhite labor is at least partly offset by the fact that in-firm
training is required to compensate for the educational deficiencies imposed by
the social system. And two, nonwhite hiring at these levels of employment is
highly visible, and the firm that undertakes it risks costly reaction from its
white employees, government, and the public. The evidence we found of quite
mixed results should not surprise us. 5 8
The fact that so many U.S. firms with operations in South Africa were
willing to adopt the Sullivan Principles and were reluctant in the late 1970s
and early 1980s to leave South Africa is also consistent with the hypothesis
that there were gains as well as losses from this adoption. Certainly, the
evidence on share prices offers no support for the idea that implementing the
Sullivan Principles was, on net, costly to the signers. Kaempfer et al.
(1987) find no significant declines in the share prices of those firms that
signed the Principles compared to those that did not or between those with
high Arthur D. Little ratings compared to those with low ratings.59
58. In fairness to the firms involved, it should also be remembered that all
the data on management change came from one twelve-month period,
1977-1978, when the Sullivan Principles had barely begun.
59. In fact, the share prices of non-signatories rose by less (at the 1% level
of significance) than the share prices of signatories (Kaempfer et al. ,
1987, pp. 462ff). Their sample consisted of 105 "South-Africa-active"
companies, 95 of them signers of the Sullivan Principles and ten non-
signatories.
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The final verdict on the ability of private pressure to implement
social change, as exemplified by the era of the Sullivan Principles, cannot be
reached until the full sample of the Arthur D. Little surveys is evaluated.6 0
The partial evidence offered here suggests, not surprisingly, two things.
First, such pressure yields positive results when it helps the firms to feel
forced to do what it is already profitable to do -- i.e. hire more nonwhites
in jobs they are currently capable of doing and will do at lower wages than
white workers. But second, the results are less clear when firms are urged to
do the unprofitable -- i.e. unilaterally raise nonwhite wage rates or
undertake extensive programs to upgrade nonwhite workers into higher-level
jobs.
60. The confidentiality of the submissions precludes, according to D. Reid
Weedon Jr., Senior Vice President of Arthur D. Little, even the large-
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APPENDIX A: Companies That Subscribed to the Sullivan Principles
Table Al below provides summary information about all the companies
that were Sullivan Principle signatories at some time between 1977 and 1986.
This information comes from a series of annual reports (Little, various years)
compiled by Arthur D. Little Inc., the official evaluator of the performances
of the Sullivan subscriber firms.
The table summarizes three pieces of information: a complete list of
signatories of the Sullivan Principles, the year of the first Arthur D. Little
Report in which they appear as signatories, and the "grades" that were
assigned each year to each of the companies as a measure of their progress.
The first column of the table gives the names of all companies that
were Sullivan signatories. Although companies provided information separately
for each division or subsidiary in their reports to Arthur D. Little (and to
the IRRC), Arthur D. Little only reported information for the company as a
whole. Division names are therefore not reported separately in this table.
The second column of the table gives the date of the first report in
which each of the companies appeared as signatories. In many cases these
dates were the closest we could come to determining when the companies
actually signed the Sullivan Principles. For many of the companies in our
sample, we were able to get more accurate signing dates from various newspaper
articles.
The rest of the table summarizes the grades that the companies
received from Arthur D. Little. There is a key at the end of the table
explaining what the different grades mean over the years. In general the
three grades which are the most relevant for the companies reporting in any
period were, "making good progress", "making progress", and "needs to become
more active".-
Two sets of grades were reported in 1979: 1979a and 1979b. Initially,
semiannual progress reports were issued, but by 1980 it was decided to release
only annual reports. The report for 1979a was for the period ending 31 March
1979, and for 1979b it was for the period ending 15 October 1979. The reports
for 1980-1986 were issued in October or November of each year.
In the places in the table where more than one grade is reported for a
company in any one year, this means that different divisions or subsidiaries
of that company received different grades. The reports, however, do not
specify which subsidiary or division received which grade.
In some cases companies either withdrew from the Sullivan Principles,
left South Africa, or were dropped by Arthur D. Little for non-reporting or
for non-payment. These are noted in the table by the letters W, L, or D,
respectively, under the year in which they occurred. Sometimes these
companies still received a grade during that year - - if so, it is reported.
In cases where grades appear after a company has withdrawn, this means that
they rejoined the program during the year in which the first grade after
withdrawal appears .
During the period some companies were involved in mergers and some
underwent name changes . These are denoted in the table by *number* under the
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year when they occurred, and the action is described in the notes at the end
of the table.
Finally, some companies joined very late, and some never received
grades (without explanation in the reports). These companies are listed in
the table with blanks throughout the grading columns.
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TABLE Al
COMPANIES WHO ACCEDED TO THE SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES
NAHE OF COMPANY
FIRST |............. GRADES RECEIVED IN A. D. LITTLE REPORT ............ |
REPORT 1979a 1979b 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
ABBOTT LABORATORIES
AFIA WORLDWIDE INSURANCE
AIRPRODUCTS AND CHEMICALS INC










AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORP












BAUSCH AND LOMB INC
BAXTER TRAVENOL LABORATORIES INC
BECHTEL GROUP INC
BECOR WESTERN INC
BELL AND HOWELL CO
BENDIX CORP















CHAMPION SPARK PLUG CO
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3A,4A
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5 3A 2 3A
FR 3 6 3B 3A
2 6 6 6 W




















COMPANIES WHO ACCEDED TO THE SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES
FIRST ............ GRADES RECEIVED IN A. D. LITTLE REPORT .............. :
REPORT 1979a 1979b 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986NAME OF COPANY
CHEESEBOROUGH-PONDS INC 10/25/85




COCA COLA CO 10/8/80
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO 6/30/78
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING INC 10/25/85
CONTROL DATA CORP 6/30/78
COOPER INDUSTRIES 10/8/81
COULTER ELECTRONICS INC 10/25/85
CPC INTERNATIONAL 6/30/78
CROWN CORK AND SEAL CO INC 3/31/79
CUTLER-BANNER INC 3/31/79
DART INDUSTRIES INC (& KRAFT) 3/31/79
DEERE AND CO 6/30/78
DEL NONTE CORP 6/30/78
DELOITTE, HASKINS AND SELLS 3/31/79
DINERS CLUB (SA)(PTY) LTD 11/12/86
DOMINION TEXTILE INC 11/1/82
DONALDSON CO 6/30/78
DOW CHEMICAL INC 10/15/79
DOW CORNING CORP 10/25/84
DRESSER INDUSTRIES INC 10/25/84
DUKANE CORP 10/25/84
DUN AND BROADSTREET CORP 11/12/86
D'ARCY NCNANUS&NASIUS WORLDWIDE INC 10/8/81
EASTMAN KODAK CO 6/30/78
EATON CORP 10/25/84
ELI LILLY AND CO 6/30/78
EMERY AIR FREIGHT CORP 10/25/85
EMHART CORP 10/25/85
ENGLEHARD MINERALS AN CHEMICALS CORP 6/30/78
ENVIROTECH CORP 6/30/78
ESB RAY-O-VAC MANAGEMENT CORP 6/30/78




FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER CO 6/30/78
JOHN FLUKE HANUFACTURING CO INC 3/31/79
FLUOR INC 3/31/79
FMC CORP 3/31/79
FOOTE CONE & BELDING COMMUNICATIONS 10/25/85
FORD MOTOR CO 6/30/78
FOSTER WHEELER CORP 10/25/84




1 2 2A 2A 2A
1 1 1 1 1 1,4C
4A W
5 1,2,3B 1,3B 1,2 1,2A 2A 1,2B
1 1,2 1,2,3 1 1,2 1 1 1,2A 1
2A
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
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6 W
6 6 3 2A 1
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1 1 1 1,2A 1
6 3A 2A,3 2A 3A
3A 3A 3A 3A 3A
3B 3B,4A 2B 2B 2B
3A 3A 3A 2A L
3B 2 1 1 1
6 6 3A 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 2A 2A
3A 3A
1 1 2 3A 3A 6 3 2A 2A
5 4 4B 4B W
TABLE Al
COMPANIES WHO ACCEDED TO THE SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES
FIRST :.............
NANE OF COPANY REPORT 1979a 1979b
GRADES RECEIVED IN A. D. LITTLE REPORT..........
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986








GENERAL TIRE AND RUBBER CO
GILLETTE CO
GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER CO




FRANK B HALL AND CO INC
HARNISCHFEGER CORP
HARPER GROUP















INTERNTNL CORR SCHOOLS INC
INTERNTNL FLAVORS & FRAGRANCES INC
INTERNTNL MINERALS & CHEMICALS CORP
INTERNTNL TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH
INTERPUBLIC GROUP OF COS INC
SC JOHNSON & SON INC
JOHNSON CONTROLS INC
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TABLE Al
COPANIES WHO ACCEDED TO THE SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES
FIRST |............. GRADES RECEIVED IN A. D. LITTLE REPORT ............
REPORT 1979a 1979b 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986NAME OF COMPANY
HACHILLAN INC
HARRIOTT CORP






HERCK & CO INC
HIDLAND ROSS CORP
HILIPORE CORP
HINE SAFETY APPLIANCES CO











AC NIELSON INTERNATIONAL INC





































3 6 6 3B 2A,3B 2A 2A
1 2 1 1 1 1
2 3A 3A 6 3C w
1 1,2 1,2 1,2 1 1,2 1,2A 2A 1
3A
5 L
5 3 3B 3B 3B 3A 3A 3A
1 1 2,6 1,3A 1,3A 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2A









3 3A 3A 3A 3A 2A L
4 4A 38 2 2A
3 3B 38 3B 3A 3A 2A
3 3A 6 N
2 2 3A 3A 3A 2A
NA 2 3 3A 3A N
5 6 48 4B 4B
5 6 6 3B 2,3A, 2,3A,4B
3B,4B
1 1 3 1,6 4A 4A
4 2B 2B
1 1 1
NORTON SIHON INC 6/30/78
OGILVY GROUPS INC 10/25/85
OLIN CORP 3/31/79
OTIS ELEVATOR (UNITED TECH) 6/30/78
OWENS-ILLINIOS INC 10/25/85
PACKARD INSTRUMENT (PTY) LTD 10/25/84
PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS INC 3/31/79
PARKER HANNIFAN CORP 11/12/86




PHELPS DODGE CORP 6/30/78
PHIBRO CORP 10/8/81
PHILLIPS PETROLEUN CORP 6/30/78
PIZZA INN INC 11/12/86
RANK XEROX LTD 6/30/78
RAYCHEN CORP 11/12/86
RAYTHEON 10/8/80









2,6 2,6 2,6 3A,38,6 1,28,3 1,28 1
2 2 2,6 2 2A 2A 2A
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1 6 1 3B,6 2,6 3A,6 2A,3 3A 2A,NR(44
5 6 W
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4 48 48 W
3 38 3A 3A,4A 3A 2A 2A
6 6 6 N
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TABLE Al
COMPANIES WHO ACCEDED TO THE SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES
FIRST ;............. GRADES RECEIVED IN A. D. LITTLE REPORT..,...
REPORT 1979a 1979b 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986NAME OF COMPANY
REYNOLDS AND REYNOLDS CO









JOSEPH E SEAGRANS & SONS INC
GD SEARLE AND CO
SENTRY INSURANCE MUTUAL CO
SIGNAFORN CORP
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2 2 2 3A,4B 2A,4B 2A,4
L
L
1 1 1,2 1,3A 2 2 2A 2A 2A
5 *9*
WSFR 1 1 2 3A 3A
2
1
2 3 3d 6 W D
2 6 6 6 W L
2A
2 1 2 1 2,5 2A 1,2A 1,21
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 21
1 2 2,3,6 2,3B 2 3A 3A 2A
5 2 3A *11*
1
5 2 W L
1 2 2 1 2 3A 2A 2A 2A
2 3 3 1 2 1
5 3A,4A 2A 3A 2A
5 6 6 6 6 W
4B,5 4B 4B 4 2B 2B
5 6 6 3B W 2A





2 4 4A 4A W
4 4B 4B W
W L
1,2 1,2,3 1 1,2,4B 1,2,4B 1,2A 1,2A,2B 1,2A
2 2 3A 6 W
1 2 2 2 1,3A 2,3A 2A 2A 2A
5 L
5 3A,3B 6 1,3A 1,2A 1,2A 2A
1 2 1,3 2 2 1,3A 21,2B 2A,2B 2A
.5 D
TABLE Al
COMPANIES WHO ACCEDED TO THE SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES
FIRST I|............. GRADES RECEIVED IN A  D. LITTLE REPORT .............. I
NAME OF COMPANY REPORT 1979a 1979b 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
WESTIN HOTEL CO 10/25/84 5 D
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP 6/30/78 1 2 3 3B 2 1 2A 2B 2B
WHITE MOTOR CORP 6/30/78 4 4
WILBUR-ELLIS CO 3/31/79 2 2 2 2 3A 3A 3A 3A 3A
WILSON LEARNING CORP 10/25/85 5
Notes:
FIRST REPORT means the date of the first report in which the firm appeared as a signatory.
All words below in quotation marks are those used in the A. D. Little.reports.
1979a: 1 : "Making acceptable progress
2 : "Cooperating"
4 : "Endorser" (no employees)
5 : New signatory
6 : Did not report
NA : Report received too late for analysis
I : Did not report for some (unspecified) reason
1979b: Same as above except:
1 : "baking good progress"
2 : "Making acceptable progress"
3 : "Needs to become more active"
IR = "Inadequate report"
SFR : "Submitting first report"
1980: Same as above
1981: Same as above except:
2 : "Making progress"
3A : "Received low point rating"
3B : "Did not pass basics"
4A : "Endorser" (no employees)
4B : "Endorser" (10 or fewer employees)
4C : "Endorser" (holds less than 19% equity in South African operation)
1982, 1983: Same as above
1984, 1985, 1986: Same as above except:
2A : Based on full report
2B = Based on short-form report
NR() : Non-reporting minority owner (percentage of ownership)
W : Withdrew from Sullivan Principles
L = Left South Africa-
D : Dropped (by A. D. Little) for either non-payment or non-reporting
TABLE Al
COMPANIES WHO ACCEDED TO THE SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES
Notes (continued):
*1* = Merged with Cigna
*2* = Now listed under Norton Simon
*3* = Now listed under Raytheon
*4* = Now listed under American Can
*5* = Now listed under Kennecott Copper
*6* = Acquired by Eaton Co
*7* = Now listed under RJ Reynolds
*8* = Acquired by Cooper Ind
*9* = Acquired by Nonsanto
*10* : Now listed under Goodyear
*11* : Acquired by Nabisco
APPENDIX B: Data Sources and Procedures
The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) publishes South
Africa Review Service, which deals with investment issues relating to South
Africa. The wage and labor data used in this paper came from a number of
reports contained in that series. Some U.S. companies that were signatories
to the Sullivan Principles agreed to provide the IRRC with information similar
to that reported to Arthur D. Little. This information, unlike that provided
to Arthur D. Little, was not released under condition of confidentiality. The
wage and labor data that we used came from company reports and updates
provided by these companies.61
The companies provided information on many aspects of the Sullivan
Principles for the period from the early 1970s to the middle 1980s. Our
interest was in the data pertaining to wages and employment. The data were
reported in vastly different ways: For different years; with different job
classifications; some provided wage data, others did not; and the form of the
wage data differed.
In order to utilize the labor data (in Section III), the reported data
had to meet certain criteria. First of all, to measure changes over time, we
needed at least two years of data. Second, firms reported labor figures for
their own particular job classifications, and these had to be the same for any
pair of years. 6 2 For many companies, we were able to find more than one pair
of years with the same job grades; and for some companies, the job
classifications were not identical but were similar enough that a slight
regrouping of the data was all that was necessary to make two years
comparable. 6 3
Preparation of the data for the wage calculations (in Section IV)
proved more difficult. Company reporting of wages was less uniform than the
reporting of employment. Wage data were reported to IRRC in two ways. One
set of companies reported average wages for each job grade and for each of the
racial groupings (i.e. black, Asian, colored, and white). The weighted
average for the first three groups (i.e. black, Asian, and colored) was
calculated, so that we ended up with average wage rate for two groups, "non-
whites" and "whites", for each job grade.
The other set of companies reported, for each job grade, the following
data: the minimum wage for the j ob grade (Ymin), the maximum wage for the j ob
grade (Ymax), the average wage rate (of all races) for the job grade (Yave)'
and the fraction for each racial group of the labor in that job grade earning
61. A list of the companies is provided in Tables Bl, B2, and B4.
62. The classifications changed over time for almost all of the companies for
which IRRC reported data.
63. For example, if the employment data for two categories, such as "manager"
and "supervisor", were given separately in one year and combined in the
other of two nearby years, we would use the combined classification for
the comparison of the years.
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more than that average wage rate. Since roughly half of the companies in our
wage sample provided their wage data in this form, we decided on a procedure
to translate this information into estimates of the average wage rates of
"non-whites" and "whites". By assuming a three-tiered uniform distribution
for each race, we were able to use the information mentioned above to estimate
average "non-white" and "white" wages for this subset of companies.64
Tables Bl and B2 list the companies that comprised the two samples we
used to study labor and wage changes of non-whites; and Table B4 lists the
companies used in the section on management and supervisory jobs. The tables
provide the following information: the names of the companies in the sample
(the divisions or subsidiaries are specified if they were reported
separately), and the pair or pairs of years for which we found usable data for
each company. 6 5
The employment and wage data for all South African manufacturing (used
in Section V) are given in Table B3.
64. By three-tiered uniform distribution, we mean a constant frequency from
Ymin to Ymin + Ymax - Yave' a different constant frequency from there to
Yave, and a still different constant frequency from there to Ymax- (Pave
was always nearer Ymax than Ymin.) There are three parameters to such a
distribution. That the cumulative distribution must reach one at the
maximum wage determines one parameter. The known fraction of the labor
above the average wage determines a second. We assumed the third
parameter for each race to be as near equal to that of the other race as
is consistent with positive values for all the parameters, and then the
fact that the known overall average wage must equal the weighted average
wage of the two races determines that third parameter. With these
estimates of the three parameters, we could then estimate the average wage
by race within the job category. This arbitrary procedure was checked
against, and always was consistent with, common sense.
65. The decimal part of the year date indicates the month and day of the data
reported. E.g. 1977.00 refers to 1 January 1977 (or 31 December 1976);
1977.33 refers to 30 April 1977 (or 1 May 1977).
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Table B1




Borg Warner, Axle Division
Borg Warner, Axle Division
Borg Warner




















Exxon, Esso Standard Depot
Exxon, Esso Standard Head Office
Exxon, Esso Standard Head Office
Exxon, Esso Standard Division
Exxon, Esso Standard Division
Exxon, Esso Standard Division

















































































Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing (3M)
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing (3M)











































Note: Where no division is given, the data refer to the company's
entire South African operations.
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Table B2
Firms in the Wage Sample (Section IV)
Company Year Pairs
Borg Warner, Axle Division
Borg Warner, Axle Division










Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing (3M)
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing (3M)






















Note: See note for Table Bl.
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TABLE B3
South African Manufacturing, 1972-1985 -- Employment and Wages by Race
Year Eiployment .......................
Whites Nonwhites Growth Lw Growth Ln
Salaries and Wages (R1000)
Whites Nonwhites Total
Average Wage ........................













































































































































































Average Growth Rates 1.15% 1.30% 13.54% 16.37%
Notes: 1. Source: Central, 1986.
2. The coverage of the data changed slightly in 1976.
Two figures are given for that year, the upper
comparable to the data preceding it, the lower
comparable to the data following it.
3. "Growth" refers to the growth rate in that year over the
preceding year. The average growth rates at the bottom of
the columns are simple averages of the figures above.
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Table B4










Exxon, Esso Standard Head Office







































Note: See note for Table Bl.
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